September 10, 2026

Dear readers,

I sincerely hope that July and August offered you more respite than it did German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who vacationed for 23 days on the shores of Bavaria’s picturesque Lake Tegernsee. Too long, in the eyes of some of the public. But perhaps he needed a breather following his half-hearted cabinet reshuffle earlier this summer.

Is it frivolous to measure the seriousness of the various crises that punctured the German summer by whether they merited a disruption to Merz’s summer getaway? In the chancellor’s estimation, at least, the Leipzig/Halle airport drone incident and serious forest fires around the country did not.

The same cannot be said, however, of the right-wing extremist Alternative for Germany’s devastating surge in Saxony-Anhalt last weekend—which Berlin is still absorbing while bracing for two more state elections on September 20. The chancellery would like to push off the post-mortem for now, but for much of the country and Merz’s Christian Democrats, the question of whether Merz can still lead is front and center.

Our September newsletter features two incisive pieces on the Europeanization of NATO from our Reimagining Europe’s security project by Michael E. O’Hanlon and Carlo Masala. Anna Colin Lebedev draws out how war has changed Russian and Ukrainian societies—in very different ways. Aslı Aydıntaşbaş raises Turkey’s approach to disarming the PKK as a possible model for handling armed insurgencies elsewhere. And Kari Heerman and I joined The Beijing Brief podcast to unpack how Europe is reckoning with China Shock 2.0.

Yours steadfastly,

Constanze Stelzenmüller

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

The Brookings Institution

How can a 'Europeanized NATO' defend Europe with reduced American support?

Two pieces interrogate the form, feasibility, and value of an increasingly Europeanized NATO. Carlo Masala lays out how NATO's conventional military capabilities would fare against Russian aggression in "fight tonight" or "2029" scenarios, assuming no or minimal U.S. support. Michael E. O'Hanlon argues that Europe lacks the capabilities to take full responsibility for its defense, but that tripling the projectable force of NATO's European members would be immensely valuable to the alliance.

Read more from Brookings' Reimagining Europe's security project

Russia and Ukraine: Societies transformed by war

War has driven Russians and Ukrainians far apart. In an essay based on her Raymond Aron Lecture, taking adaptation, the social contract, and mutual perceptions as lenses, Anna Colin Lebedev illuminates the similarities both societies still share—and the important ways they diverge. 

Read more

Revisit previous Raymond Aron Lectures

Here's how one country may have solved a violent uprising

With its peace process law, Turkey's government has taken a promising step toward national reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Writing for the New York Times, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş suggests the Turkish case may offer lessons for the disarmament of other rooted insurgent groups, such as Hamas or Hezbollah.

Read more in the New York Times

Can Europe survive China Shock 2.0?

Kari Heerman and Constanze Stelzenmüller join hosts Jonathan A. Czin and Ryan Hass on Brookings' The Beijing Brief podcast to discuss the threat China poses to the European Union, and particularly to Germany, traditionally the bloc's economic backbone. Europe is by no means powerless, but its ability to respond depends on member states' political will and bandwidth.

Listen here

For more on this topic, read a new roundup of recommendations and forecasts from Brookings experts.

Q&A with Anna Grzymała-Busse

In April elections, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party were ousted after 16 consecutive years in power which saw significant democratic backsliding. New Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government has since embarked on a sweeping constitutional repair process. We asked CUSE Nonresident Senior Fellow Anna Grzymała-Busse about Hungary’s political transition and its relationships with partners. 

How do you assess Péter Magyar and his Tisza party’s first several months in power? How concerned should we be about the risk of overreach given the pace and scope of change?

Magyar moved quickly in four critical areas. The 17th amendment to the constitution, passed in July, rolled back the concentration of powers engineered by Fidesz. First, the government restored judicial rules that had been in place before 2012, including age limits, shorter terms, and extensive legislative review powers restored to the Constitutional Court. The reform also rolled back the so-called "cardinal laws": the number of policy areas that had been put under a two-thirds supermajority lock was reduced, and fiscal policy, public finances, state asset management, and the budget were returned to ordinary legislative processes. Third, the reforms launched a new National Asset Recovery and Protection office, to audit and review the decisions and contracts of the previous government. Finally, Magyar abolished the system of foundations that allowed Fidesz cronies to assume full control over universities and their finances in the name of efficiency. 

This parliamentary supermajority, and the ability it grants to transform the constitutions and the fundamental legal scaffolding of the country, both allows reform and raises questions about potential abuses. For example, the Fidesz-affiliated former president was removed from office through questionable means. Similarly, the national media financing has been dismantled to prevent a Fidesz-style takeover, but Tisza can also now effectively control the content of state media. 

Are we seeing the European Union effectively bring Hungary back into the fold? Will a Hungary less prone to blocking EU decisions see its influence on the European stage diminished? How significant is Hungary’s transition for Ukraine? 

The EU has unblocked over 16.4 billion euro from funds that were frozen under the Orbán administration. That’s 14% of Hungary’s GDP, and an enormous amount of funding to absorb. That money has not yet reached Hungary, but it signals a major shift in relations, with Magyar pledging full cooperation with the EU. It also means that the Orbán veto is effectively gone. The other spoiler, Robert Fico of Slovakia, has developed warmer relations with Russia, but he’s retreated considerably after Magyar’s election, partly thanks to the threat of EU rule-of-law investigations that could freeze EU funding for Slovakia. 

Unlike its predecessor, the Magyar administration has condemned Russia, lifted the earlier opposition to financial support for Ukraine and signed a bilateral agreement with Ukraine. But Magyar has also signaled caution on Ukrainian EU membership and will not send Hungarian military aid. 

Orbán's government cultivated close ties to the Trump administration, and his defeat was broadly interpreted as a rebuke for U.S. support for right-wing populists in Europe. What is Magyar's vision for Hungary's relationship with the United States, and what obstacles might he encounter along the way?

Magyar is focused, first and foremost, on domestic reform and repairing relations with the European Union. He remains a conservative politician, skeptical about immigration and protective of what he views as Hungarian national and cultural traditions. He has not engaged the United States or the Trump administration, but he is not alone in that. Far more importantly, Viktor Orbán conceded the election immediately—a commitment to democratic outcomes that is not necessarily shared by his fellow right-wing populists in the United States.