Plus, a Q&A on security guarantees for Ukraine
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Brookings Center on the United States and Europe

September 11, 2025

Dear readers, 

 

Travel to faraway places sharpens one’s sense of the shifting order (or disorder) of things. I went to Taiwan, Singapore, Sweden, and Greenland last month, and the vulnerability and anxiety of small countries faced with aggressively revisionist great power neighbors was tangible everywhere. (Also: whale blubber is an acquired taste.) If ever a time has called for collective action to preserve public goods like the environment, freedom of navigation, or indeed peace, this is it. But the events of this week alone—France’s government collapsed on Tuesday, and NATO member states on Wednesday had to scramble against 19 Russian drones in Polish airspace—show that in Europe, too, disruption is becoming the new normal. 

 

Our back-from-a-short-summer newsletter has Jim Goldgeier interviewing the historian Stephan Kieninger about his new book on Strobe Talbott. The former U.S. deputy secretary of state and Brookings president was instrumental in steering Europe and the transatlantic relationship through one of the 20th century’s most consequential geopolitical shifts, and this publication could not be more timely. We also feature Angela Stent on the aftermath of the Alaska Summit, a Q& A with Steven Pifer on European efforts to pull together security guarantees for Ukraine, and more. 

 

Finally, we want to note that CUSE alumna Amanda Sloat, a former member of the Biden administration’s national security staff who now teaches at IE University in Madrid, has a new podcast, “Power & Purpose” with Nathalie Tocci, director of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome and a former advisor to EU high representatives; have a listen! 

 

Yours resolutely,  

 

Constanze Stelzenmüller 

Director, Center on the United States and Europe 

The Brookings Institution 

 
Strobe-Talbott-reuters

Strobe Talbott’s diplomatic legacy 

 

James Goldgeier interviewed Stephan Kieninger, author of Securing Peace in Europe: Strobe Talbott, NATO, and Russia After the Cold War, about Talbott’s role in crafting U.S. foreign policy on Russia, NATO expansion, and the Balkans, and his staunch commitment to mentorship and diplomacy.  

 

Read more

Beyond the Alaska summit 

 

The Alaska summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin last month resulted in limited diplomatic outcomes. Angela Stent argues this lack of progress and conflicting goals between U.S. and European leaders after the summit present a challenge for future negotiations to end the war. 

 

Read more 

Germany’s national security council isn’t up to the task

 

While the new German national security council is a much-needed addition to the nation's defense infrastructure, Constanze Stelzenmüller argues the council lacks the scale and authority of its U.S. counterpart, raising concerns about its ability to help Berlin tackle modern security threats. 

 

Read in the Financial Times 

 

Europe’s difficult trade-off between military and welfare spending: the Italian case

italy-s-military-spending-vs-public-debt-over-time

Amid global turmoil, Italy’s struggle to balance rising defense obligations with welfare commitments and debt service reflects a broader European dilemma. Carlo Bastasin examines the Meloni government's attempt to meet NATO spending targets without undermining domestic political stability. 

 

Read more 

 
Q&A with Steven Pifer 

  

On September 4, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that leaders from 26 nations had pledged to provide postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. Steven Pifer breaks down the commitment and what it means for the future of Ukraine.  

 

The “coalition of the willing” met in Paris last week, agreeing to boost aid to Ukraine. What are the key components in the pledge? Will the support be enough to reassure Ukraine while deterring Russian escalation?  

  

President Macron said 26 countries have pledged to contribute troops—ground, sea and air elements—that would, among other things, make up a “reassurance” force to deploy to Ukraine once a ceasefire or peace agreement is concluded. The force would signal the commitment of the participants to Ukraine’s security. Many details remain to be worked out, including where the force would deploy in Ukraine and its specific missions. A key question is what support Washington would provide to “backstop” the force (see below). 

  

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took part in the meeting and expressed satisfaction with the general framework. He noted that the “central element of security guarantees” would be a strong Ukrainian military well-equipped with modern weapons and capable of deterring another Russian attack. Indeed, that could be Kyiv’s best security guarantee. Questions of how to provide Ukraine with the arms and funding to maintain such a force remain to be agreed. 

  

The guarantees include potential deployment of European troops to Ukraine, a significant departure from past agreements. Why the change in calculus, especially considering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat of retaliation on European soldiers on the ground?    

  

European members of NATO as well as the United States have been reluctant to deploy troops to Ukraine while Ukraine and Russia were engaged in active combat, concerned that NATO could be pulled into direct conflict with Russia. Beginning last year, however, the British and French began discussions regarding a possible force that might deploy to Ukraine once the fighting ends. The idea of a “coalition of the willing” arose because neither NATO nor the European Union would be able to achieve a consensus among all members to deploy such a force. 

  

Putin has threatened that European soldiers in Ukraine would be “legitimate targets” for attack, “especially during the ongoing hostilities.” However, the Europeans seem to have concluded that, without solid security guarantees, it will be very difficult for Ukraine to agree to a settlement, for fear that Russia might simply regenerate its military and attack again at a future point. 

  

Security guarantees for Ukraine should not be negotiated with Russia. Presumably, if the Kremlin concludes that it cannot achieve its goals on the battlefield and that the costs of continuing to try are becoming too high, Russian readiness to accept a ceasefire or peace settlement in which Western countries provide Ukraine with security guarantees might change. 

  

What is the role of the United States in these guarantees and how might its involvement, or lack thereof, influence the commitment of other countries? 

  

British and French officials made clear early on that their plan to deploy a “coalition of the willing” force required a U.S. “backstop." They emphasized this after Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that the U.S. military would not participate in any peacekeeping force and that such a force would not come under the protection of NATO’s Article 5 (which establishes the principle of collective defense according to which an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all). 

  

However, in August, President Trump said Washington would help the Europeans and suggested U.S. air power was on offer. U.S. and European officials later reportedly were discussing support for the European force, including U.S. intelligence and surveillance assets. The discussions address the kinds of support that Britain and France hope the United States would provide, most importantly air power should the force come under attack. However, it appears that no final decisions or commitments have been made. 

  

Following the past weekend’s Russian bombing attacks against Ukraine—the largest mass aerial attack since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which among other targets struck the building housing the Cabinet of Ministers—a ceasefire, much less a peace agreement, seems farther away than ever. The question before the United States and Europe now is whether they are willing to impose further costs on Russia (sanctions and/or confiscation of the frozen Russian central bank reserves) in order to compel it to stop its attacks and bring it to the table. 

 

     
    More research and commentary
       

    Security guarantees. Philip Gordon lays out for Just Security how the Taiwan Relations Act can serve as precedent for adequate security guarantees for Ukraine. 

     

    Racism in the U.K. With immigration at the forefront of British politics, Anand Menan argues in the Observer that racist rhetoric is becoming normalized in political discourse, despite a progressive Labour government in power.  

     

    💡 In case you missed it

    • Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security
      Steven Pifer, Freeman Spogli Institute
     

    About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings

     

    The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect trans-Atlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.

     
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