Last week, I had the privilege of being hosted for a conversation about the U.S. midterms by the Helmut and Loki Schmidt Foundation—in the former German chancellor’s modest bungalow in an equally modest suburb of Hamburg (pictures here). Knowing that Schmidt had regularly received state guests in this house—from French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev (picture)—in the belief that such private encounters would help create better personal and professional relationships made the experience all the more poignant.
We are publishing this newsletter as U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prepare to meet in Shenzhen under very different circumstances: three leaders united by the belief (and little else) that the right of the strong to bully the weak is what Trump’s new chief of staff Stephen Miller calls one of the “iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.” (Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s invocation of the Roman general Pompey in a recent speech to the Federalist Society—“stop quoting laws to men with swords”—hits a similar note. Helmut Schmidt did like to lecture the visitors perched on his barstools, but one struggles to imagine him saying anything quite so unsubtle.)
Yet, as our colleagues Michael Kimmage and Philip H. Gordon have pointed out, a “Yalta 2.0” carve-up of the world into a tripartite condominium modeled on the 1945 summit meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in the eponymous Crimean beach resort is highly unlikely—because it turns out the weak have agency. (North Vietnam would like a word!) Trump is stalemated in a war with Iran and has alienated Canada. China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors and the Europeans are signing trade and investment agreements with each other at a record pace; and Ukraine has just blown up large segments of Putin’s special prestige project, the Kerch Bridge, which connects Russia with the Crimean Peninsula. The message delivered by American voters on November 3 was no less explosive.
Our November newsletter alerts you to what promises to be a rich discussion tomorrow morning on America’s role in European security, a collection of assessments by Brookings scholars on what to expect of the Shenzhen meetings, Thomas Wright’s incisive analysis of intra-Democrat policy debates, and a Q&A with Anand Menon on Britain’s European options.
Finally, some happy CUSE news: we are delighted to announce that David Cadier, a seasoned expert on Central and Eastern Europe from France, has joined us as a visiting fellow. Proper introduction to follow!
Wishing you an excellent Thanksgiving (and may we have things to be thankful for),
Amid serious uncertainty over the current and future scope of the U.S. role in Europe, leaders and societies on both sides of the Atlantic are grappling with the implications for the security of the continent. On Thursday, November 19 at 10:00am ET, in partnership with the University of Denver and Claremont McKenna College, Brookings will convene a public discussion on European security, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and America's role.
Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are set to meet in Shenzhen this week—their third face-to-face encounter this year. Six Brookings scholars project that progress will likely be contained to areas such as an AI incident channel, military crisis hotlines, and perhaps more time on the trade truce. The real wild card is a planned three-way meeting with Vladimir Putin.
With the U.S. midterm elections in the rearview mirror and the 2028 presidential campaign kicking off, the Democratic Party is hashing out its policy positions on key issues including AI safety and the technological race with China, the U.S.-Israel relationship, and the U.S. role in the world. In Foreign Affairs, Thomas Wright maps out the debate between centrists and progressives on these and other topics.
A U.K.-EU “reset” is taking shape ahead of a much-anticipated November 20 summit. Prime Minister Andy Burnham is expected to articulate a wider vision for closer relations with the EU, up to and including potentially rejoining the bloc. We asked CUSE nonresident senior fellow Anand Menon about the U.K.’s evolving relationship with the European Union.
How have instability in the transatlantic relationship and the international environment more broadly changed the U.K.’s strategic calculus about its relationship with the EU?
Significantly! The declining reliability of the U.S. as the guarantor of European security, plus the unpredictability—and at times outright hostility—of Donald Trump, have certainly changed the calculus of many in the governing Labour Party. Not because the EU is key to effective military cooperation—it is not—but because of a sense that we need to work more closely with European partners, particularly in areas like defense procurement, where the U.K.’s exit from the EU has made such collaboration harder. In addition, there are geoeconomic changes—the increasing protectionism of both the U.S. and the EU (the former continuing under President Joe Biden)—which make the U.K.’s situation more exposed. In response to the China shock, the EU is drawing up a series of measures under the label “Made in Europe” that might have very negative consequences for U.K. industry, and a closer relationship might be one way to avoid this.
How effectively is Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s government communicating the possibility of rejoining the EU to the British public? What are the most significant political risks for Number 10 and the Labour Party?
He has, to date, merely kick-started a debate. At the Labour Party conference in September, he asserted that he would be willing to consider all options, including membership. He also promised a “national conversation.” What we don’t know is which of the various alternative forms of relationship with the EU the prime minister will come out in favour of. There are plenty of people within his party who do not want to relitigate Brexit and oppose the idea of the U.K. seeking to rejoin the EU. On the other hand, a significant majority of Labour members and Labour voters, and a majority of the public, are now expressing support for joining. We should get more clarity following the November 20 summit about the government’s direction of travel.
What (and whom) are you watching most closely ahead of the November 20 summit?
In a curious way, and because the prime minister has started this debate about the medium-term relationship between the U.K. and the EU, the summit promises to be something of an anticlimax. The negotiations started under Keir Starmer—over deals on trade in agricultural products, on aligning our emissions trading systems, and on a new youth mobility scheme—look unlikely to be fully completed in time. Even if the first two are basically settled, it seems unlikely that the EU will agree to implement them unless and until the U.K. gives ground on allowing EU students to pay domestic fees at U.K. universities as part of the youth mobility scheme.
On the other issues the U.K. government is keen to discuss, it is hard to imagine much being agreed at the meeting. The EU will not negotiate over its Made in Europe scheme until its final shape has been determined by member states, the Commission, and the European Parliament. As for the prime minister’s longer-term vision, I’m sure we will see some language welcoming Burnham’s more positive tone, but ultimately the EU will want to wait and see what kind of relationship the U.K. asks for before responding.
So, in short, the key “tells” will emerge after the summit rather than at it, as the U.K.’s next “national conversation” on our relationship with the EU gets underway.
More research and commentary
A new Yalta? President Trump can't hope to decide Ukraine's future without Europe, argues Michael Kimmage for The New York Times. In pushing Europe to take more responsibility for its own security and that of Ukraine, he has also made it Europe's war.
AI strategy. Taking Jensen Huang's departure from Nvidia as an entry point, Thomas Wright makes the case in The Atlantic for reappraising the American approach to the technological competition with China. Wright advocates for export controls, while dismissing the idea of agreeing on a pause or slowdown on AI development with Beijing.
About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings
The Center on the United States and Europe(CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect transatlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.
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