The Hutchins Roundup brings the latest thinking in fiscal and monetary policy to your inbox. Have something you'd like us to include in the next Roundup? Email us and we'll take a look.
This edition was written by Elijah Asdourian, Alex Conner, Georgia Nabors, and David Wessel.
Stephen J. Cole of Marquette University, Enrique Martínez García of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, and Eric Sims of Notre Dame use surveys of expected inflation, output growth, and interest rates to estimate central bank credibility for advanced economies between 1990 and 2022. They find that the Fed is the most credible central bank, followed closely by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE), while the Bank of Japan lags its peers. Credibility fell for all central banks over the period, with an especially noticeable dip for the ECB and BoE at the onset of COVID. Because a central bank’s ability to make credible commitments about future policy is a key determinant of the effectiveness of forward guidance, the authors argue that imperfect credibility partially explains the weakness of forward guidance in stimulating inflation after the Global Financial Crisis and dampening it after COVID.
Low-income families whose babies have very low birthweights are eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Using public health data, educational data, and census records from 1993 to 2019, Amelia Hawkins of Brandeis and co-authors find that SSI cash transfers do not improve long-term outcomes for low-birthweight infants or their siblings. The cash transfers are substantial for infants born under the weight cutoff—27% of recipient families’ incomes, on average—yet long-term educational attainment, use of public assistance, and mortality are unaffected by receipt of SSI in infancy. The authors note that this is a “surprising” result, as previous literature has documented large and sometimes intergenerational effects of cash transfers in early life on outcomes and suggests that generous cash interventions are not sufficient to “’undo’ some of the long-term disadvantage associated with poor health at birth.”
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Corporation following the Fed’s 2022 monetary tightening led many to question the effectiveness of bank examiners. Using data from all commercial bank performance ratings, Yadav Gopalan of Indiana University and João Granja of the University of Chicago find that when the Fed began rate hikes, bank supervisors downgraded the liquidity and sensitivity to risk ratings of the banks most exposed to interest rate risk. However, bank supervisors did not downgrade the liquidity ratings of banks heavily reliant on uninsured deposits, despite their heightened risk exposure due to less stable funding sources. The authors show that banks subject to ratings downgrades reduced their holdings of longer duration securities, a move to mitigate risk as assets with longer maturities lose value under high rates. They conclude that bank examiners limited some systemic risk in 2022 and potentially deterred additional bank failures.
“My baseline projection is for real GDP growth to moderate to somewhat below its potential rate over the next year as restrictive monetary policy and tighter financial conditions restrain economic activity, and I expect this below-trend growth will be associated with some further softening in the labor market. As we watch how conditions evolve, I remain highly attuned to risks to achieving both components of our mandate," says Michael Barr, Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve for supervision.
"There is a robust debate about the lags of monetary policy transmission; how long it takes for past tightening to come into full effect. While these lags are difficult to estimate, I expect that the full effects of past tightening are yet to come in the months ahead. I strongly agree with what Chair Powell has said about where we are in the tightening cycle. Given how far we have come, we are now at a point where we can proceed carefully as we determine the extent of monetary policy restriction that is needed. In my view, the most important question at this point is not whether an additional rate increase is needed this year or not, but rather how long we will need to hold rates at a sufficiently restrictive level to achieve our goals. I expect it will take some time.”
Join us for an event
The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy invites you to attend "The price cap on Russian oil: Is it working?" This online event will be livestreamed on October 16, 2023, from 2:30 PM - 3:30 PM EDT.
The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington,DC, 20036