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This edition was written by Andrew Rosin, Jack Spira, Zixun Tan, and Louise Sheiner
In 2024, a major Chinese e-commerce platform introduced AI tools into the software merchants use to run their businesses. For about $14 a month, the tools helped merchants create product images and listings, analyze sales, and handle customer service. Using the platform’s proprietary transaction and operating records for about 149,000 merchants that adopted the tools and 77,000 similar merchants that did not, Panle Jia Barwick of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and co-authors estimate that adoption increased merchants’ monthly sales by 51.6%, driven primarily by a 47.0% jump in order volume, with little change in average order value. The gains were much larger for smaller merchants: sales increased 61.5% for those in the bottom size quartile, compared with 10.3% in the top quartile. The authors suggest that smaller merchants benefit disproportionately because AI gives them affordable access to business capabilities previously available mainly to larger firms. They find little evidence that AI adopters gain sales at their competitors’ expense, suggesting that AI expands overall market activity rather than redistributing sales.
Does the maturity structure of a government's debt matter for the effectiveness of its spending? Morteza Ghomi of the Bank of Spain and coauthors analyze over 60 years of post-war U.S. macroeconomic data and find that spending shocks accompanied by increases in the ratio of short- to long-term debt are associated with much larger increases in output than those accompanied by decreases in that ratio. After four quarters, the estimated spending multipliers are 1.85 for short-term and 0.42 for long-term debt. Their empirical results point to consumption as the crux: private consumption increases following spending shocks associated with more short-term debt but not those associated with more long-term debt. The results hold across different sample periods and even after controlling for government debt, wages, and interest rates. To explain these findings, the authors develop a model in which households face uncertain spending needs and can save in both short- and long-term government bonds. In the model, short-term bonds can more readily be used to meet unexpected expenses, so increasing their supply reduces the need for precautionary saving and increases private consumption. When calibrated to U.S. post-war data, the model also generates larger government spending multipliers under short-term than long-term debt financing, although the magnitude of the difference depends on monetary and fiscal policy assumptions.
Analyzing five advanced economies over the past quarter century, Andrea De Michelis and co-authors at the Federal Reserve Board find that the pass-through from oil prices to core inflation—which excludes volatile food and energy prices—increased after the pandemic. In particular, a 10-percentage-point rise in relative oil-price inflation, which had essentially no effect on core inflation before the pandemic, now raises it by an estimated 0.14 percentage point. Core inflation itself also has become roughly twice as persistent, meaning that oil-driven increases in core inflation now fade more slowly. Using oil futures prices from August 2026 and assuming these post-pandemic dynamics persist, the authors project that average core inflation across the five advanced economies (Canada, the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.) could peak at nearly 2.8% in mid-2027—roughly 0.6 percentage point above the level implied by pre-pandemic dynamics—before falling to about 2.2% by the end of 2028. The authors caution that the estimated effect of oil prices on core inflation may be overstated, since the post-pandemic relationship between oil prices and core inflation “may partly reflect the co-movement of oil prices with broader global demand pressures.” Even so, the greater upside risk to inflation suggests that oil-price shocks may now pose a greater challenge to monetary policymakers.
"This stability amid such choppy conditions was hard to forecast, to be sure. Many have predicted the low-hire, low-fire equilibrium would have broken by now. Many have predicted an imminent recession. Many have predicted an AI jobs apocalypse. None of these have yet materialized," says Tom Barkin, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
"What we have seen is stubbornly elevated inflation. Resilient demand paired with broad-based cost increases have put upward pressure on prices. Firms tell us this pressure continues and is leading them to also try to pass on increases that they’ve absorbed to date. They feel they face less resistance to higher prices than they did pre-pandemic, perhaps because a generation of customers and procurement professionals have become accustomed to accepting increases. Should the economy remain on its current path, the risk lies on the inflation side of our dual mandate.
"But I am alert to the elephant in the room: What could bring this remarkable resilience to an end? The path of AI feels particularly consequential. If it underdelivers, business investment could pull back, stock prices could follow, and so too could asset-fueled consumer spending. The risk runs the other way, too. AI could overdeliver and displace more workers than expected, resulting in a pullback in spending. Either scenario would move attention to the maximum employment part of our mandate."