The latest research on fiscal and monetary policy, curated by the Hutchins Center at Brookings. ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­    ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­  
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Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings

November 19, 2026

 

The Hutchins Roundup brings the latest thinking in fiscal and monetary policy to your inbox. Have something you'd like us to include in the next Roundup? Email us and we'll take a look.

 

This edition was written by Chesapeake Dowdy, Chase Parry, Zixun Tan, and David Wessel

 

Hard-to-reach life goals push people to gamble

Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage argued in 1948 that even risk-averse people may gamble for a chance to move into a higher social class. Today, economic pessimism among young adults in advanced economies and gambling-like financial activities have risen together. Costas Arkolakis of Yale and co-authors link the two phenomena: when major life milestones—such as homeownership, marriage, or social mobility—seem unattainable through conventional saving, individuals turn to high-risk financial gambles as a possible path to reaching them. Using a 2026 survey of 2,300 South Koreans and linked credit bureau, credit card, and mobile app records for 1.4 million people from 2021 to 2023, they find that people who place greater importance on achieving their goals are more likely to own highly speculative assets like cryptocurrency even after accounting for expected returns. Among aspiring homeowners, crypto ownership peaks among those with moderate wealth, for whom a big gain could cover a down payment. Behavior also shifts when life goals move closer or further away: winning a lottery that provides the right to purchase a home at below-market prices reduces cryptocurrency app use by 21%, while becoming unemployed increases it by 6%. The authors take these patterns as a sign of broader economic frustration.

Household debt shapes monetary policy transmission 

One way that monetary policy affects the economy is through changes in the cost of household borrowing, including credit cards, auto loans, and mortgages. Rajashri Chakrabarti of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and co-authors examine this transmission mechanism by comparing the effects of changes in the federal funds rate across counties with different levels of household debt relative to income. Rate hikes had larger adverse effects in more indebted counties than in less indebted ones: credit card balances and delinquencies rose faster, while mortgage and auto borrowing weakened more. More indebted counties also experienced larger declines in employment growth following rate hikes, and these employment effects persisted for four years. Rate hikes had larger effects than rate cuts of comparable size. The effects on household borrowing and financial distress were particularly strong in counties with more adjustable-rate mortgages, which expose borrowers to larger changes in debt payments when interest rates change. Consistent with this, the effects of household debt on adverse financial outcomes were larger in 1999–2008, when these mortgages were common, than in 2015–2023, when they were not.

Higher tariffs are linked to weaker exports from Canada and Mexico

In March 2025, the U.S. imposed 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico, but exempted goods that comply with the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Average effective tariff rates were 5.4% for Canada and 8% for Mexico, yet exports of Canadian goods to the U.S. fell about 10% from 2024 levels, while Mexican exports rose about 16%. Chris Avalos, Musa Orak, and Avani Pradhan of the Federal Reserve Board find that Mexico's export growth was driven by a surge in exports of computers and servers assembled in Mexico to meet demand from U.S. AI data centers. These exports, which faced relatively low tariffs, more than accounted for Mexico's overall export growth; excluding machinery, Mexican exports fell about 2%. Looking across sectors within each country, the authors find that those facing higher tariffs saw weaker exports to the U.S. In Canada, a 10-percentage-point higher tariff was associated with 5% weaker exports relative to other Canadian sectors; in Mexico, the corresponding figure was 12%, although the difference was not statistically significant. In Canada, the export weakness associated with higher tariffs was concentrated in steel, aluminum, and copper, which faced particularly high tariffs, while in Mexico, it was more widespread.

US dollar rebounds

A fever chart displaying the ICE US Dollar index between Q1 2024 and Q4 2026

Chart courtesy of the Financial Times

 

Quote of the week

“Looking ahead, I am focused on two plausible inflation scenarios for the next 18 months. Under the first and likely scenario, persistent strong demand and ongoing supply pressures keep inflation elevated absent some additional firming of monetary policy. I agree with Chairman Warsh's characterization of the recent increase in the FOMC policy rate as ‘removing a dose of accommodation.’ In my view, current policy is not yet restraining inflation,” says Alberto Musalem, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

 

“However, there is an unlikely but still plausible scenario in which additional policy firming will not be required. Falling energy prices and lower shipping costs, or an increase in potential output growth driven by higher productivity growth, might ease inflation pressures such that inflation moves toward target in 18 months. Alternatively, aggregate demand might slow more than is now expected, perhaps because spending on AI or data centers slows substantially, or financial conditions tighten abruptly and wealth effects-driven consumption spending decelerates.

 

“Because I view the first scenario as more likely than the second, I continue to judge that further removal of monetary policy accommodation will be required soon. The economy will likely require several interest rate increases before the spring of 2027 to achieve 2% inflation in a timely manner…

 

“It would be preferable for a higher real policy rate to happen in a balanced way, driven both by lower inflation and a higher nominal policy rate. However, the nominal policy rate may need to do most of the work.”

 

About the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings

 

The mission of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy is to improve the quality and efficacy of fiscal and monetary policies and public understanding of them.

 
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