Q&A with Caitlin Talmadge
Against the backdrop of a deteriorating European security environment—continuing Russian attacks on Ukraine, and now U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran to which Iran is responding with horizontal escalation in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean—Europeans have begun unprecedented discussions about collaboration on nuclear deterrence. We asked Caitlin Talmadge, nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, to help us understand these developments.
How do you evaluate French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent speech on “forward deterrence,” the Franco‑German decision to institutionalize nuclear deterrence collaboration, and calls for nuclear cooperation among Nordic states?
These are all reactions to the changing security environment in Europe, both in terms of rising threats from Russia and declining reliability of the United States—but the substance of these developments differs significantly.
With respect to Macron’s speech, it is important to be clear about what he did and didn’t say. France is not getting into the extended deterrence business, in the sense of offering a nuclear security guarantee to anyone. Rather, France is elaborating on the “European dimension” that has always been part of its conception of national interests, which its nuclear deterrent helps to protect.
Specifically, Macron communicated that threats to other European states such as Germany and Poland could implicate France’s own security, and thus that France might have to consider employing nuclear weapons in response. But again, the emphasis is on doing so because of the implications for France’s own security, not because of a commitment to the security of these other states per se. And this idea is not new.
However, the measures Macron announced to implement this “forward deterrence” concept do represent a change. France will enlarge its arsenal and is making qualitative improvements as well. It has secured bilateral agreements with nine European states—including Germany and Poland, but notably not the Baltics—to facilitate their participation in nuclear exercises and perhaps develop their ability to conventionally support French nuclear operations. Macron also spoke of temporary deployments of “elements of our strategic air forces to allied countries,” seemingly a reference to dual-capable aircraft on allied territory, though likely not actual nuclear weapons. Many questions remain, but it is clear that France’s nuclear posture is evolving.
Meanwhile, several European states are showing interest in developing their own nuclear forces. This is where we hear calls for a “Nordic nuke," as well as comments from Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk about his country potentially acquiring its own arsenal. These statements reflect the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and recognition that French “forward deterrence” is not a substitute for it. Developing a survivable nuclear arsenal is a sporting (and costly) proposition, however, and it is not clear at all that these states can actually achieve it, especially if the United States does not offer its blessing and if the Russians have any opportunity to prevent it.
Trump administration officials have recently affirmed the continuing validity of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Europe. But with transatlantic trust under strain and U.S. attention increasingly drawn to the Middle East and the Indo‑Pacific, is this promise still a solid foundation for European security?
It is good that the Trump administration has explicitly restated its continued commitment to the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Europe. The problem is that these words come against the backdrop of a repeatedly disparaging administration posture toward Europe, epitomized in Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2025 and the recently issued National Security Strategy. Given all of this, Europeans are right to question the credibility of U.S. nuclear commitments.
Unfortunately, they do not have a good alternative. Britain simply does not have adequate independent nuclear capability to get into the extended deterrence business. France’s arsenal, while more robust, is also not suited to this purpose, and Macron’s speech made clear that France is not interested in taking on this role. Other countries may be interested in acquiring their own nuclear weapons—I would certainly be thinking about this were I the leader of a Baltic state or Poland—but getting from here to there without the United States’ blessing, and without inviting Russian preventive attack, seems very hard.
Realistically, the most important thing these states can do to improve their security is actually to focus on strengthening their conventional defenses. All realistic scenarios for a nuclear deterrence failure in Europe begin with a conventional defense failure. Europeans can and should be doing more to prevent that from happening. States in the west should focus on mobility assets that can help them get their already considerable military power to NATO’s eastern flank in time to thwart Russian aggression during a crisis. States in the east should continue and expand efforts to make themselves hard to attack, such as the Baltic Defense Line.
How do you assess nuclear proliferation risks in other regions beyond Europe?
Proliferation risks are real and growing due to a combination of heightened pressure by adversaries and declining trust in U.S. security commitments. These dynamics are most concerning in Asia.
China is undergoing the fastest and largest nuclear expansion in its history along with its already impressive conventional military modernization, and its relationship with Japan has taken a nosedive in the last year. These developments are changing the conversation around nuclear weapons in Japan. I do not believe Japan is anywhere close to a decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons, but some of its defense investments, for example long-range strike capability, can be read as a precursor to a nuclear capability should Japan’s security situation grow more dire.
North Korea’s nuclear threats have also led to strong public support for nuclear weapons in South Korea, and South Korea, too, has built some of the conventional military capabilities that would be relevant to a nuclear arsenal should it go that route. But again, getting from A to B without the United States’ blessing, and without a preventive attack from North Korea, is easier said than done. It is in the United States’ interest to maintain a credible nuclear umbrella and avoid these developments.
