Plus, a Q&A on NATO’s 75th anniversary summit and an in-depth look at European energy security.
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Brookings Center on the United States and Europe

July 18, 2024

Dear colleagues and friends, 

 

As Washington’s summer temperatures hit the 100s (for European readers: 37-38 degrees Celsius), American politics are heating up in parallel. Last week, the capital hosted NATO’s 75th anniversary summit. Our newsletter covers NATO and European security exhaustively, with an explainer by Jim Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders, and a collection of incisive pieces by Mariana Budjeryn, Dan Hamilton, Kemal Kirisçi, Steven Pifer, Melanie Sisson, and Angela Stent. Steven Pifer also dissects the summit for this edition’s Q&A.

 

But we are not monomaniacs. Samantha Gross and I have an all-you-ever-wanted-to-know-and-then-some essay on the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on European gas markets (tl;dr: it’s complicated); this is the opening salvo of a two-year project on European energy security in wartime. Tara Varma discusses France’s elections and search for a government with Ted Reinert.

 

And, in writing not unrelated to the current Republican convention in Milwaukee, Fiona Hill has published a deeply-researched essay on deindustrialization and polarization in the United Kingdom and Germany. The undersigned wrote about the MAGA right’s counterprogramming to the NATO summit—including a keynote by Donald Trump’s VP pick, JD Vance.

 

Finally and in happier news, our Nonresident Fellow Mariana Budjeryn was honored with the William E. Colby Military Writers’ Award for her book "Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine." And Fiona Hill will serve as an external reviewer for Britain’s newly announced Strategic Defence Review. She also received her CMG (Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George) from HM King Charles III. Those of us no longer ruled by monarchs were, er, fascinated to learn that this required her to wear a "fascinator" (for American readers: tiny hat-like ornament perched upon a lady’s head at an improbable angle). 

 

Yours ever (nerves not de-jangled yet), 

 

Constanze Stelzenmüller

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

The Brookings Institution

 
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NATO is on the ballot in 2024

 

The United States has always played an indispensable role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). James Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders break down the alliance’s endurance despite long-standing tensions over burden-sharing, and explain how a Donald Trump win in November could threaten risk a U.S. exit. 

 

Read more 

 

For more analysis, listen to Goldgeier discuss the NATO summit on The Current podcast.

How France united, once more, to defeat the far right

 

French snap elections earlier this month resulted in an unexpected loss for the far-right National Rally and victory for a complex coalition on the left. Ted Reinert spoke to Tara Varma about the outcome, the far right’s reaction, and the implications a delicate coalition could have for domestic and foreign policy. 

 

Read more

Safeguarding Ukraine’s democracy during the war

 

Ukraine has not been able to hold elections since the Russia’s full-scale invasion, while the Zelenskyy administration has come under criticism for infringing on checks and balances. Mariana Budjeryn explains how democratic backsliding risks undermining wartime cohesion and how civil society and Ukraine’s Western partners can help.

 

Read more

 

Join us for an event

 

Finland, NATO, and the future of trans-Atlantic security: A conversation with Ambassador Hautala 

Tuesday, July 23, 2024, 3:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

  

Join us at Brookings or online to discuss Finland’s role in NATO’s collective defense and the future of the alliance with Ambassador of Finland to the United States Mikko Hautala.

 

Register to attend or watch 

 

Europe’s messy Russian gas divorce

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Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine upended the European gas market. In the first of a series of papers on European energy security, Samantha Gross and Constanze Stelzenmüller examine Russia's weaponization of energy, how individual countries managed the shock to supply, and efforts to strengthen European energy independence. 

 

Read more

 

Q&A with Steven Pifer 

 

Last week, over 30 world leaders made their way to Washington, D.C. for the 75th anniversary summit of NATO. We asked Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, about the outcomes of the summit and the future of the alliance.

 

Ukraine has been central to NATO’s agenda since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. What were the alliance’s main policy decisions with regards to supporting Ukraine’s self-defense and Kyiv’s potential future membership in the alliance?

  

The Ukrainians hoped for, but seemed to understand that they would not receive, an invitation to join NATO at the Washington summit. While a growing number of allies believe Ukraine should receive an invitation to join, others, notably the United States and Germany, remain reluctant. The Washington summit declaration termed Ukraine’s path to membership "irreversible," stronger language than in the 2023 summit communique, but Kyiv will continue to press for more.

  

The summit declaration and other documents issued in Washington catalogued NATO member commitments to bolster Ukraine’s military, including a "minimum" of 40 billion euros ($43 billion) in the next year for security assistance, one SAMP-T and four Patriot air defense batteries, the coming arrival of the first F-16 fighters, establishment of a Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training and Education Center in Poland, and creation of the NATO Security and Assistance for Ukraine program. NATO seeks to persuade Moscow that it will sustain its commitment to support Kyiv. 

  

By the final day of the summit, NATO and Ukraine also could point to bilateral security agreements that Kyiv had concluded with 23 countries and the European Union since 2023. These contain commitments to help Ukraine strengthen its defense capabilities and support Kyiv, both in its current fight and in any future conflict with Russia. They have been described as part of the "bridge" that will carry Ukraine ultimately to NATO membership.

 

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has long called U.S. commitment to European allies into question over what he sees as insufficient defense spending, and some have speculated he would withdraw from NATO in a second term. Is there a way to "Trump-proof" the alliance?

  

European leaders worry about what a possible return by Trump to the White House would mean for the U.S. commitment to NATO. Alliance members have boosted defense spending, and 23 of 32 allies now meet NATO’s target of 2% of gross domestic product for defense, up from nine when Trump left office. It is unclear if this would satisfy the former president, who remains skeptical about the alliance, has a hard time criticizing Vladimir Putin and Russian actions, and is critical of U.S. aid for Ukraine. Trump's choice for vice president, JD Vance, has criticized European allies for not spending more though has not sounded as skeptical about NATO as Trump. That said, nothing suggests that he would challenge Trump's position on the alliance.

  

Some, including his third national security advisor, believe Trump would withdraw from NATO. However, even if he did not withdraw, he could easily undermine the U.S. commitment to the alliance. Were he to be president in 2025, how would the Kremlin read his February comment that the Russians could do "whatever they hell they want" to allies who did not meet the 2% goal?

  

"Trump-proofing" NATO would not be simple. It would require a significant increase in defense spending by European members to strengthen their conventional forces, including replacing U.S. capabilities such as air-to-air refueling and precision-guided conventional strike missiles; some kind of agreed nuclear structure to substitute for U.S. strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces that now provide the alliance’s ultimate security guarantee; and the emergence of a country or countries to take on the U.S. leadership role. 

  

The summit declaration called China "a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine." What does the tougher language on China this year indicate for U.S-European cooperation on policy towards China going forward?

  

The summit declaration’s tougher language regarding China suggests that differences between how European members of NATO and the United States view the challenge posed by a rising China are narrowing. A big factor behind this is China’s support for Russia as the Kremlin wages war on Ukraine. While the "no limits" partnership clearly has limits—China is not sending Russia weapons—allies are unhappy about Beijing’s support for the Russian defense industrial base, which undercuts the impact of Western sanctions on Russia. The summit declaration hints at consequences if China continues such support.

  

Beyond backing for Russia’s war on Ukraine, allies also expressed concern about Chinese cyber and disinformation operations in the Euro-Atlantic region, and they criticized Beijing’s irresponsible nuclear behavior—it is rapidly building up its nuclear arsenal while refusing to engage in discussions on strategic risk reduction.

 
More research and commentary
 

Republican foreign policy. As NATO convened in Washington, so did the National Conservatives. Constanze Stelzenmüller argues in the Financial Times that while Republicans have been invoking Ronald Reagan’s "peace through strength," Senator JD Vance and other NatCons invert the vision of the 40th president. 

  

U.K. social cohesion. Fiona Hill writes in the Journal for Urban Regeneration and Renewal that rapid deindustrialization can lead to political polarization, stating that the United Kingdom can learn from Germany’s policies to combat the lack of social cohesion in "left-behind" communities.

  

Ukraine strategy. Trans-Atlantic discourse on Ukraine is not resisting the pull of imagination over analysis, Melanie W. Sisson warns. She argues that we need to focus on ending the war with an achievable, good outcome of a sovereign Ukrainian state led by an autonomous government rather than more unrealistic goals.

 

NATO and the IP4. The deepening relationship between Russia and China amidst Russia’s war against Ukraine has reshaped understanding of how European and Asian security are linked. Angela Stent writes that NATO must cooperate more closely with the West’s Asian allies.

 

💡 In case you missed it

  • Addressing flow security risks in an age of disruption 
    By Daniel S. Hamilton, Brookings 
  • Black Sea mine sweeping aids a subtle convergence of Turkish-US policies By Kemal Kirişci, Brookings 
  • Could NATO survive a second Trump administration? 
    By Steven Pifer, Brookings 
  • What happens after the Kim-Putin summit? 
    By Hanna Foreman, Angela Stent, and Andrew Yeo, Brookings
  • Europe Alone: Nine thinkers on the continent’s future without America’s embrace. 

    By Mark Leonard, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Nathalie Tocci, Carl Bildt, Robin Niblett, Radoslaw Sikorski, Guntram Wolff, Bilahari Kausikan, Ivan Krastev, and Stefan Theil, Foreign Policy 

 

 

About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings

 

The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect trans-Atlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.

 
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