I opened last month’s letter with this famous quote from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (and I wish to restate here that while I am a Marxist of sorts—see below—I am not now, nor have I ever been, a Communist): “there are decades when nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen.” Recent developments suggest the need for a Revised Lenin: “there are weeks where everybody rushes around pretending that decades are happening but actually nothing has happened.”
I refer, of course, to the opening of “talks” between Russia and Ukraine. Their outcome so far is not quite nothing; the agreement that Moscow and Kyiv will exchange prisoners of war is good. The divergences between the White House and Kremlin readouts of Monday’s two-hour phone call between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin: not so much. The Russian leader continues to insist that the “root causes of this crisis” be addressed, which is Putinish for rolling back NATO enlargement and getting the U.S. out of Europe. Speaking of Europe, French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Germany’s new Chancellor Friedrich Merz traveling to Kyiv together, and hearing them issue a stern ultimatum of “massive sanctions” to Putin was an excellent sign. Seeing them next huddled over a speakerphone in Albania to talk to POTUS: ok fine.
But now they urgently need to match decisive actions to their forceful words and gestures. The European Union’s 17th sanctions package is good news, especially because it targets the Russian “shadow fleet” in the Baltic—a topic on which our Brookings colleagues Robin Brooks and Ben Harris have been doing a lot of work. But much more remains to be done.
Otherwise, they risk illustrating another famous saying by Groucho Marx: “Those are my principles, and if you don’t like them… well, I have others!”
This month’s newsletter features a breakdown of the Polish elections by Anna Grzymała-Busse, an analysis of the recent U.S.-U.K. trade deal by Dan Hamilton, and the 2025 Lennart Meri Lecture, delivered by me, as well as an insightful Q&A about the goings on in Turkey with Aslı Aydıntaşbaş. Finally, we cordially invite you to join us on June 4 for the 20th annual Raymond Aron Lecture, given by Camille Grand with Mara Karlin and Peter Rough as discussants.
As always, we hope you enjoy reading our analysis and commentary.
The first round of presidential elections in Poland showed a very narrow lead for the center-right Civic Platform (PO) over the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS). Anna Grzymała-Busse explains the results, stressing that these elections could be a deciding factor in the strengthening or further dismantling of Poland's democratic institutions.
Despite threats of a trade war, the U.S. and U.K. signed a trade deal, offering some relief to those hit hardest by Trump’s tariffs. However, Daniel S. Hamilton argues the agreements in this deal may be more symbolic than substantive, with London providing a model for other European capitals hoping to strike trade deals with Washington.
The trans-Atlantic relationship is being tested. Constanze Stelzenmüller delivered the 2025 Lennart Meri Lecture in Tallinn, Estonia where she stressed both potential for cooperation and the importance of European red lines in the face of the Trump administration’s “America First” agenda on security, geoeconomics, and democracy.
On June 4, CUSE will host Camille Grand for the 20th annual Raymond Aron Lecture. In his remarks, Grand will break down scenarios and challenges for European security in light of a changing trans-Atlantic relationship. Following the address, Mara Karlin and Peter Rough will join Grand for a discussion moderated by Constanze Stelzenmüller.
A series of significant events coalesced in Turkey and its neighborhood last week. We spoke to CUSE Fellow and Director of the Turkey Project, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, to break down the developments.
Last week, Istanbul hosted the first face-to-face peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in over three years. What, if anything, came out of these meetings and what do they tell us about Turkey’s role as mediator in the conflict?
Much of the world media that descended on Istanbul for the Russia-Ukraine talks last week saw the results as anti-climactic, as there was no Putin, no Trump, and no ceasefire. I tend to think slightly differently. This was a publicity coup for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky who has now positioned himself as the “peace party” against an unwilling and difficult Russia. It is also the case that both sides committed to presenting a written document of their demands for a ceasefire. So, in a sense, Donald Trump has changed the discourse on how we discuss this war and Istanbul was a competition about who is more for peace.
The Turkish role has been indispensable, as Turkey is one of the few powers that seems to have the trust of both countries and is familiar with the details of this particular conflict. It has successfully negotiated prisoner exchanges and the grain deal—and knows a thing or two about negotiating with Russians, who can be teeth-clenching negotiators. So Turkey, I would say, is a natural intermediary both on the political and technical level. In fact, Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan presided over the whole conversation, which, in total, was a little over two hours.
The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has announced that it will formally disband, in accordance with a call in February from its jailed longtime leader, Abdullah Öcalan, to lay down arms. What does this mean for Turkish domestic politics, especially in the wake of the arrest of Istanbul mayor and opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu and the government’s subsequent crackdown on protests?
This is a phenomenal development, since we are talking about nearly a half-century of a conflict that has claimed more than 45,000 lives. It is the result of secret talks between the government of Turkey and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. It seems to be driven by a mix of geopolitical and domestic concerns and Ankara knows that to stabilize Syria and expand Turkey’s leverage, they need a deal with Kurds. But there is a cynical element to the negotiations as well, with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan likely hoping to peel Kurds off the opposition block. Having arrested one of his main rivals, the mayor of Istanbul, he now wants to isolate the secular opposition by presenting a new Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation deal. He is the ultimate pragmatist and can change his policies to fit his domestic political needs, transitioning from being anti-Western to pro-Western or nationalist to a peacemaker.
President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa during his Middle East trip last week—the first meeting between a U.S. president and a Syrian leader in 25 years—and lifted economic sanctions on the country. How significant was this for post-Assad Syria, and what does it say about the new Middle East and America's role in it?
Another big news of the week – and frankly, no one saw this coming! As soon as the Trump administration came to power, it made a point of cutting off all contact with Damascus and banishing the new regime. It was also insistent on keeping Assad-era sanctions. But then President Trump goes to Saudi Arabia and boom! He announces that he is lifting the sanctions! This is clearly driven by a push from the two leaders Trump likes-- Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdoğan – and not out of a desire to help or rebuild Syria. But it is absolutely the right thing to do. Syrians have layers and layers of U.S. sanctions going back decades and, because of the extraterritoriality of U.S. sanctions, no country or company has been able to touch Syria for fear it would also be sanctioned. Now at least Syrians have a chance. I think the legal and technical work of lifting sanctions will still take time but it was very touching to see Syrians celebrate it on the streets.
More research and commentary
Merz’s victory. Constanze Stelzenmüller unpacks the unprecedented second-ballot election of Friedrich Merz as chancellor by the German parliament, arguing that the narrow victory and party infighting does not bode well for the new CDU/CSU-SPD coalition in the face of a rising Alternative for Germany.
U.S., Russia, and Ukraine. After failing to end the war quickly, President Trump must rethink his strategy for peace in Ukraine. Thomas Wright argues that Europe must increase its aid to Ukraine, with the U.S. providing the materiel Europe cannot, to prove to Putin that this war is unwinnable.
World War III. Fiona Hill joined the Guardian’s Today in Focus podcast to discuss the Trump-Putin relationship, dissolution of international systems, and a growing probability of global conflict.
About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings
The Center on the United States and Europe(CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect trans-Atlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.
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