In late July of 1994, I was sitting in the American embassy in Kigali, in front of a man who was pulling a Penguin paperback of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars out of his desk. I was a rookie journalist, and I had come to the Rwandan capital to write about the horrific genocide that had just seen an estimated 800,000 people killed in six weeks. When I asked the diplomat whether he thought that rumors of revenge killings by troops of the victorious rebel leader Paul Kagame were true, he opened the book and read this famous line to me: “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
I often thought of that scene in the past week as the outlines of the Trump administration’s policies for Ukraine, Europe, and Russia unfolded, and especially while listening to Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference. Invoking the idea of might-makes-right seemed like an anomaly three decades ago. Today, it appears we are being told that might is right.
Our newsletter features analysis by Steven Pifer of the diplomatic efforts underway to end Russia’s war against Ukraine, a discussion on this weekend’s German elections between Sophie Roehse and yours truly, and Jim Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders dissect the national security implications of DOGE. And finally, we asked the all-star delegation of Brookings scholars attending the Munich Security Conference about their takeaways from a weekend that for once actually deserves the tired adjective “historic.”
Yours steadfastly,
Constanze Stelzenmüller
Director, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution
P.S. I asked the diplomat to make me a photocopy of the page with the quote, because I thought I might question my own memory if I did not. I still have it. Kagame is Rwanda’s president to this day.
February 24 marks the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Steven Pifer unpacks the military and political calculus of both sides of the war and what peace negotiations could look like—with or without Ukraine and Europe at the table.
A heated debate about migration policy, an ascendant far right, and a fracturing “firewall” against collaboration with it have exacerbated divisions among German parties of the center right and center left. In a Q&A with Sophie Roehse, Constanze Stelzenmüller breaks down the high stakes for Germany’s February 23 election and the challenges of coalition building that lie ahead.
Since Trump’s inauguration, Elon Musk and his team at the Department of Governmental Efficiency (DOGE) have gained access to sensitive information at several government agencies. James Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders argue that Musk’s level of access over intelligence mechanisms risks crises of trust with allies and leaves U.S. national security vulnerable.
Monday, February 24, 2025 | 10:00 a.m.-11:15 a.m. ET
On February 24, 2025, Brookings' Center on the United States and Europe and Lawfare will hold a discussion on the war in Ukraine, looking at the path of U.S. and European relations with Ukraine before and during the conflict as well as what lies ahead in 2025 and beyond. Featuring Fiona Hill, Anastasiia Lapatina, Tyler McBrien, Constanze Stelzenmüller, and Benjamin Wittes.
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) took place last weekend, from February 14-16. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and increasing animosity between the Unites States and Europe, we asked three Brookings scholars who attended for their main takeaways from the conference.
Mara Karlin: 2025 represented the most consequential MSC in decades. In some ways, it felt like two different events. The first day or so was characterized by relatively traditional debates on raising defense spending targets—although with perhaps an extra dose of dedication and sincerity—and how best to tackle today’s turbulent security challenges. The mood shifted on Friday as Vice President Vance’s fervent speech encouraging far-right politics across Europe astounded participants from across Europe—and around the world. Then, on Saturday, details emerged about U.S. plans to negotiate with Russia—excluding Ukraine and Europe—while simultaneously making clear Washington's expectations that Europeans will resource this agreement. By the conference’s closing, capitals around the world—including in Asia—began worrying that the United States would be less of a leader, or even a participant, in helping contain conflicts and crises. Instead, it may be an arsonist.
Suzanne Maloney: The 2025 Munich Security Conference provided an extraordinary opportunity to witness in real time the implosion of the prevailing international security order and to begin to anticipate the potential consequences for the United States and the world. While it’s hardly surprising that the return of Donald Trump to the White House would provoke some trans-Atlantic turbulence, Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the MSC marked something more dramatic—a historic turning point. Washington’s deliberate desecration of the shared interests and values that underpin the trans-Atlantic alliance, which has played a critical role in preserving peace and security in Europe and advancing American interests around the world, may well have the intended effect of galvanizing more responsible European investments in their own defense. But it also sent a dangerous signal of America’s unreliability and even contempt for its closest friends that will be understood and exploited by our competitors and adversaries.
Constanze Stelzenmüller: I have never, ever seen anything like this and I’ve been going to the MSC for more than 25 years. I was there for disputes over the Kosovo air war, 9/11, the Iraq war (remember German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer flinging a “I am not convinced!” at U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld?), the Putin speech in 2007, heated disputes over arming Ukraine in 2014, and the coming of Trump I. We’ve seen many harsh clashes over foreign and security policy, very often with legitimate arguments on both sides. And my own country, Germany, has deserved its share of criticism for its dependence on Russia and China, and European or transatlantic policies that too often ricocheted between sanctimoniousness and selfishness. But in all those disagreements, we remained grateful to America: for saving us from ourselves in 1945, for midwifing our new constitutional order in 1949, for protecting us against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and for generously chaperoning the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But for a Vice President of the United States to scold us that keeping the Alternative for Germany, one of Europe’s most shamelessly hard right parties, from governing is anti-democratic; and then to meet with its leader; that is utterly unprecedented. I’m still in Europe, and the shock and dismay are palpable. My colleague Mara Karlin calls Trump’s America an arsonist; to many here, it feels like a self-immolation.
More research and commentary
Trade with Turkey. With the threat of tariffs from the Trump administration, Kemal Kirişci and Onur Bülbül argue Turkey should deepen its relationship with the European Union as a more stable, long-lasting trading partner.
Defending Ukraine. Michael O’Hanlon and Paul Stares identify a multilayered territorial defense system as a key solution to building long-term defense capabilities, advising that planning for budget, shape, and size for a robust Ukrainian military should begin now.
Turkey-Syria. Following regime change in Syria, Turkey is seeking to expand its influence in the region. Aslı Aydıntaşbaş argues it will serve European interests if all parties can reach a peaceful agreement on the role of the Kurds.
The right’s schism on worker visas. The H-1B visa program has sparked controversy between right-wing tech entrepreneurs and MAGA loyalists critical of immigration. Anand Menon and Jonathan Portes analyze the racist rhetoric and economic interests which color the controversy, drawing comparisons to similar critiques on skilled worker visas in the U.K.
Stabilizing NATO. With the American commitment to NATO in doubt, Daniel S. Hamilton and Hans Binnendijk write that Europe can stabilize the alliance with increased defense spending in a “Strategic Responsibility Initiative,” a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, and a role in deterring conflict with China.
About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings
The Center on the United States and Europe(CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect trans-Atlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.
The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington,DC, 20036
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