Plus, a Q&A on Italian politics and PM Meloni's government. ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­    ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­  
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October 15, 2026

 

Dear friends and readers,

 

The past 72 hours have been eventful to say the least: the U.S. president’s “diesel deal” with Russia in contravention of the sweeping sanctions bill signed a month ago, which generated this bipartisan protest letter from 12 senators; a huge Russian bombardment cut power for 600,000 inhabitants of Kyiv, after Ukraine’s military lost access to a military satellite intelligence source supplied by the Pentagon (the U.S. blames bad weather, Kyiv disagrees); and attacks on Starlink terminals in Poland and Bulgaria. In western Europe, U.K. Prime Minister Andy Burnham suggested his country might seek a closer relationship with the European Union, but France’s hard-right presidential frontrunner Marine Le Pen announced that, if elected, she would terminate all financial support to Ukraine and engage in a “trial of strength” with the EU, which she aims to transform. And Germans are transfixed by the arrest of a former spy chief on allegations of treason, the opening of the Nord Stream 2 trial, and the already-disruptive spectacle of the far-right AfD—aided by the tiny hard-left BSW party—preparing to govern after its victory in Saxony-Anhalt. 

 

From my own admittedly anecdotal experience, having spoken at conferences in Lisbon and Helsinki in the past two weeks, I can report an oddly mixed mood of grim resolve and buoyancy. Things look bad—but we Europeans at least know that Europe’s future is worth fighting for. And we know we still have some American friends. 

 

Our newsletter takes you to the recording of our fascinating discussion with Economics Nobel winner Daron Acemoglu on the future of liberal democracy, Bruno Cardoso Reis on Europe’s divided southern flank, a Q&A with Carlo Bastasin on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her attempts to change her country’s voting system, an essay by Aslı Aydıntaşbaş on how President Trump has changed the United States—and much more. 

 

See you on the other side of the U.S. midterms, 

 

Constanze Stelzenmüller

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

The Brookings Institution

 
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Can 'working-class liberalism' heal liberal democracy?

 

On October 13, Brookings welcomed MIT professor and Nobel economics laureate Daron Acemoglu for a discussion on the crisis of liberalism in the United States, Europe, and around the world. In conversation with Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Constanze Stelzenmüller, Acemoglu stressed the urgency of demonstrating that liberal democracy can once again deliver widespread dignity and prosperity. 

 

Watch the recording

A divided southern flank faces Trump 2.0 and NATO 3.0

 

Using minilateral formats like the Med9 more effectively would allow NATO’s southern flank to better contribute to regional security, Bruno Cardoso Reis writes. But coordination among the alliance’s southern members is also hampered by differing relationships with Washington and perceptions of the Russian threat. 

 

Read more

How Trump has changed the United States

 

Donald Trump's criticism of the post-World War II U.S. leadership role in the world has resonated with increasing debates around its value among both the nationalist right and progressive left, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş writes for Prospect. The foreign policy approach Democratic presidential contenders take in the run-up to the 2028 election will reveal much about the legacy of the Trump years. 

 

Read more in Prospect

 

Q&A with Carlo Bastasin

 

Italy’s right-wing prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, will reach four years in office next week; her government became the longest-serving in the country’s postwar history last month. We asked CUSE Nonresident Senior Fellow Carlo Bastasin about Meloni’s government and Italian politics.

 

How do you evaluate Prime Minister Meloni’s political achievements as well as her record in office? 

 

The stability of Meloni’s tenure is a function of both her political ability to keep afloat in turbulent times and the opposition’s failures. And despite the fact that she has opposed a number of important EU policies (e.g., on climate or rule of law), she has managed to preserve good relations with most of her European partners. 

  

However, of the three major reforms Meloni announced upon taking office in October 2022 to modernize Italy’s institutions, very little has been implemented. The first, judicial reform, was derailed by a failed referendum. The second, on regional autonomy, was just reintroduced as a bill on October 13, but it is still pending. The third, which was supposed to reshape the institutional framework toward a premiership, has been watered down into a new electoral law which passed last week but will face constitutional scrutiny in the coming months. 

  

Nor has the government implemented any meaningful economic reforms. At a time of technological upheaval, the government has instead chosen to protect incumbent lobbies. Likewise, it has missed the opportunity granted by substantial EU support to mend Italy’s fragile public finances. Nevertheless, buoyed by EU funds and domestic stability, the Italian economy is registering higher growth. 

 

Meloni’s electoral reform is designed to give election winners a more comfortable governing majority. How do her prospects look heading toward elections in 2027, and will the reform help her? 

 

The new electoral law awards bonus parliamentary seats to the winning election alliance, provided that it wins at least 42% of the seats. It also requires parties to agree on a prime ministerial candidate and political platform before the election—an attempt, say its supporters, to eliminate the post-election bargaining processes that in the past produced unstable multiparty coalitions. However, it also makes it highly unlikely that a unifying nonpartisan figure—like the distinguished economists Carlo Ciampi, Mario Monti, or Mario Draghi in the past—could be called upon to lead a “national unity” government of the kind that have repeatedly helped Italy avert financial collapse in recent decades. 

  

Meloni’s prospects in 2027 are directly linked to the new law. As a leader of a post-fascist party, who relies on strongly adversarial rhetoric, Meloni remains a divisive figure in Italian politics. She would have little to gain from a nonpartisan government, which would effectively marginalize her to the opposition. Next year’s election outcome remains uncertain, particularly with an extreme-right new contender, Roberto Vannacci, gaining support, so Meloni’s only option to remain in power is to obtain the strong majority bonus required by the new law. 

 

Meloni and U.S. President Donald Trump had a very public falling out over Trump’s criticism of Pope Leo XIV, after the pontiff criticized the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. What does this rupture tell us about the relationship between the European right and the Trump administration? 

 

European right-wing or sovereigntist parties have a strong sense of national identitarian character derived from a conception of the state as a historical construct imbued with unique traditions and culture. President Trump’s adversarial tone toward Europe is seen by Europeans as diminishing their identity. Trump’s criticism of the pope, for instance, irritated many European citizens—and it may have contributed to the huge success of Leo's trip to France, a country with a strong secular tradition. In fact, a possible unintended consequence of Trump’s hostility toward Europe might be that European conservative or radical right-wing parties might base their chauvinism on Europe, rather than on their nation-state alone. 

     

    More research and commentary

     

    Russian nuclear threats. The West should not be cowed by the Kremlin’s recent nuclear posturing, Steven Pifer argues. Vladimir Putin's threats center on the pretext of a Western attack on the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, which is out of the question except in the event of a broad, preceding attack on NATO territory by Moscow. 

     

    Sino-Russian relations. Even as China and Russia have proven themselves able to weather some of the ups and downs in their relationship, the United States should strategically exploit pressure points from the Arctic and Africa to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Daniel S. Hamilton and Angela Stent argue for Foreign Policy. 

     

    Germany's political center. Since their stunning defeat in three state elections in September, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats have been reckoning with the aftermath. Read Constanze Stelzenmüller and Mathilda Silbiger’s analysis of what happened and what could come next. 

     

    💡 In case you missed it

    • An outsider within: The paradox of the Europe-Turkey relationship 
      Aslı Aydıntaşbaş and Evren Balta, European Council on Foreign Relations 

    • The Makings of a Prewar World
      Thomas Wright, The Atlantic
    • Reagan, Gorbachev and What Reykjavik Started 
      Steven Pifer, Stanford CISAC
    • Putin Will Not Yield
      Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman, Foreign Affairs
    • A very German spy scandal
      Constanze Stelzenmüller, Financial Times
     

    About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings

     

    The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect transatlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.

     
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