Q&A with Lynn Kuok
The Munich Security Conference was held in Munich on February 13-15. We spoke to Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies at Brookings and an alumna of the Munich Young Leaders Program, about what she gleaned from the conference.
What stood out to you most at this year's MSC? What were the major themes of discussion behind the scenes?
The dominant preoccupation was the state of the U.S.–European alliance. Many European officials expressed relief after Secretary Marco Rubio’s speech, which was more affirming of alliance commitments than Vice President JD Vance’s remarks the year before. Tone matters—solidarity, or at least the appearance of solidarity, has value in the face of adversaries.
But U.S. questioning of security commitments, tariffs on allies, and threats to take over Greenland are likely to have lasting consequences and have already prompted European moves toward greater strategic autonomy, including early-stage discussions on closer Franco-German nuclear cooperation.
Quite apart from what the United States says or does, the deeper issue is that the incentives facing Washington today differ from those of the Cold War. Europe is no longer the singular strategic priority, and domestic political tolerance for sustained overseas commitments is thinner than it was in earlier decades.
The 2026 Munich Security Report emphasizes shifting strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. How have discussions on China and Indo-Pacific security at the MSC evolved over the last few years?
There has been greater recognition in Munich that Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security are increasingly intertwined. This has been reflected in the agenda, with more panels and side events dealing with the Indo-Pacific or the connections between the two regions, including the session with Japanese Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi on “Japan and the World” that I chaired this year
That said, much of the attention at Munich this year was understandably focused on the transatlantic relationship, even though the fundamentals of Europe’s interest in the Indo-Pacific remain strong. I expect attention to the Indo-Pacific to continue as Europe acclimatizes to a changed U.S. posture.
It was also interesting to observe how China positioned itself at Munich, particularly at a moment when Washington has in many respects created diplomatic space for Beijing. China, much like in previous years, reiterated that “we need to make sure that all countries abide by the same set of rules, i.e., the basic norms governing international relations underpinned by the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.” Yet its sharp tone toward Japan—even as Japan’s defense minister underscored the need for diplomatic engagement—undermined its effort to portray itself as a law-abiding and responsible power.
Many so-called “middle powers” in Southeast Asia and other regions have faced unwelcome pressure to choose between the U.S. and China. How do you see this playing out during the second Trump administration, and does the approach of Asian states have lessons for Europe?
Many in Southeast Asia will continue to seek to hedge, though their willingness and ability to do so will depend on the extent to which the security and economic benefits the United States offers outweigh the costs that it imposes, as well as on whether China is able to fill the gaps left by the United States. The region has long considered the United States a stabilizing force, especially in the face of a powerful neighbor, but doubts are growing about U.S. security commitments. Economically, the United States is also now seen as a source of volatility, as countries have scrambled to respond to sweeping and indiscriminate tariffs.
For Europe, its lot, particularly in the security realm, is closely tied to the United States. However, measured engagement with China could be a means of signaling that alignment cannot be taken for granted, thereby creating greater strategic leverage.
