Q&A with Jonathan Katz
In the past few weeks, Moldova and the Czech Republic both held consequential elections. Jonathan Katz, fellow in the Anti-Corruption, Democracy, and Security project at Brookings, breaks down the results and what it means for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
In Moldova’s September 28 parliamentary elections, President Maia Sandu’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won with an impressive 50.2% of the vote. How did PAS manage to secure a majority despite widespread Russian disinformation and hybrid threats?
PAS’s parliamentary majority victory was significant for Moldova’s continued EU integration path and its democratic resilience. The election was a bright spot for democracies globally. Credit for holding the line goes to Moldova’s pro-democracy actors across civil society and government who effectively mobilized to counter Russian aggression, pro-Russian parties, and other anti-democratic actors. This is not the first time Moldovan democracy and its electorate have proven resilient and withstood Russian cyberattacks, interference, and internal provocations from allied oligarchs.
PAS and President Maia Sandu were also effective in presenting a positive long-term vision for Moldova’s economic and democratic future, including near-term membership in the EU. There is strong Moldovan public support for EU accession, and a large majority of the population view the EU as Moldova’s key partner. Moreover, external partners, including the EU, Sweden, US, UK, and Canada, also played varying roles in supporting Moldovan efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media. Additionally, these partners worked with Moldova in strengthening election security and exposing pre-election disinformation and vote buying efforts.
In contrast, Czech parliamentary elections on October 3-4 saw the return to power of right-wing populist billionaire Andrej Babiš, who served as prime minister from 2017 to 2021, with his ANO party winning 34.5% of the vote. What does this victory mean for Czech foreign policy, especially with regard to support for Ukraine and Czechia’s role in the European Union?
Babiš’s win is seen by some as a win for the populist right and its agenda in Europe and as a setback for Czech support for Ukraine. There were credible reports of Russian influence operations in the lead up to the Czech parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, Czechia’s EU and transatlantic policies under Babiš may not mirror those of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán or Slovakia’s Robert Fico. Yet, Babiš could play a destabilizing role in the EU through a variety of avenues, including through his role as the co-founder of Patriots for Europe, now the third-largest political group in the European Parliament, which has been critical of EU migration and environmental policies.
On future Czech support for Ukraine, Babiš promised if elected that Czechia would downgrade its current assistance for Ukraine. However, his post-election phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on October 9, could signal a less dramatic pullback of Czech support to Ukraine.
Babiš’s return to power includes navigating possible coalition partners that are more anti-EU and anti-Ukraine than ANO. Another foreign policy check on a Babiš government is popular Czech President Petr Pavel, who will remain in office until March 2028, stating he will not seat ministers that threaten Czechia’s membership in the EU or NATO.
In what ways do the outcomes of these elections reflect broader regional trends in Central and Eastern Europe toward populism, geopolitical orientation, and political fragmentation?
Documented election interference in Czechia and Moldova shows that Russia is as determined as ever to destabilize democracies, and not just in Central and Eastern Europe. The potential for conflict escalation is heightened given recent Russian airspace incursions in Europe and an uptick in deadly Russian attacks on Ukraine in 2025. Transatlantic democratic allies and partners must track and better understand the success and strengthening of populists and far-right parties as they gain political clout. There are reasons for pro-transatlanticists to be concerned about these trends, democratic trajectories in Central and Eastern Europe, and how backsliding impacts EU and NATO stability and security.
Moldova and Czechia’s successful electoral campaigns, led by PAS and ANO, placed an emphasis on improving national economic conditions and that message seemed to resonate with voters. In Moldova, PAS touted the economic benefits to Moldovans of continued European integration. Babiš benefited from the discontent of many Czech voters regarding inflation and economic woes. The elections in Moldova and Czechia are microcosms of wider economic discontent and rising inequality globally that is linked to democratic backsliding.
