As we await the Ankara NATO summit on July 7-8 in scorching heatwaves on both sides of the Atlantic, my mind is drawn back to Iceland, its densely flowered hillsides and rushing brooks under billowing clouds and a fine mist of invigorating rain. I traveled there last week to attend the first Reykjavík Security Forum. Icelanders, whose country is a founding member of NATO but does not have an army, will be watching the meeting in Turkey intently, not least because the President of the United States has an alarming habit of saying “Iceland” when he means “Greenland.”
But the sharpest impression I took away from the conference was that Ukraine’s revolutionizing of modern warfare with its recent use of long-range drones for deep precision strikes against its Russian aggressor is birthing a new transcontinental hive mind of finance, tech, and, yes, gaming industry leaders. This development has huge potential as a source of support for the embattled Ukrainians. Europeans struggling to respond to the increasing appearance of drones—singly and in swarms, some Russian, some harder to attribute—should be tracking this development closely.
One wonders, though, whether the transatlantic alliance, which at President Trump’s insistence is laser-focused on spending as a percentage of GDP, can adapt to these transformative innovations fast enough. Outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s decision a few days ago to pivot to drones and other uncrewed vessels by scrapping costly legacy platforms is likely only the beginning of a much bigger shift.
Our July newsletter features an important essay by Aslı Aydıntaşbaş on Turkey’s search for a new Middle East order (with a central role for itself), timely reading ahead of NATO’s Ankara Summit. Mara Karlin writes an incisive dispatch from Ukraine based on an extensive multi-city trip and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Our Turkey Project publishes three insightful analyses on developments in the Turkish defense industry. And finally, Thomas Wright assesses the outlook for the summit—a meeting he considers entirely expendable. Surely more than a few diplomats involved in the negotiations share that sentiment.
Finally, and since as Europeans we have a reputation for long vacations to keep up: this newsletter takes a break in August, and so should you! See you again in September, and stay cool in the meantime!
Turkey has reemerged as a major player in the Middle East, not as the “neo-Ottoman” power its domestic rhetoric suggests but as a consequential middle power trying to manage disorder. In this comprehensive analysis, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş examines how Ankara balances key relationships and domestic constraints and highlights implications for U.S. policy in a region in turmoil.
Following a visit to Ukraine, including communities near the front lines of its war with Russia, Mara Karlin argues the country remains determined despite recruitment challenges, civilian casualties, and pressure on air defenses, and offers policy recommendations for the United States on negotiations, defense planning, and critical infrastructure protection.
Ahead of NATO’s Ankara Summit, three new pieces from Brookings’s Turkey Project examine defense and defense industrial cooperation between Turkey and its allies. Serhat Güvenç stresses that Turkey’s maturing defense industry still fails to achieve strategic autonomy; Aaron Stein highlights blockages to defense industrial cooperation with the United States; and Riccardo Gasco argues that Turkey’s defense cooperation with Italy can serve as a test case for larger integration into the European defense industrial base.
As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on and instability in the Middle East deepens, heads of state and government from all NATO member states will gather in Ankara next week for the 2026 NATO Summit. On July 6 at 10:00 a.m. EDT, CUSE will convene a virtual discussion on what to expect from the summit.
From economic chokepoints to international security, the war in Iran has completely reshaped the geopolitical landscape. Brookings experts analyze the short- and long-term effects this conflict will have across the world.
On July 7–8, NATO allies will gather in Ankara, Turkey, for their annual summit. After more than four years of war in Ukraine and amid growing uncertainty about America’s role in European security, this meeting could prove consequential for the future of the alliance. We spoke with Brookings Senior Fellow Thomas Wright about what to watch for.
What are the main issues for the NATO Summit in Ankara? How does this year differ from previous gatherings?
Ideally, this summit would not be happening at all. There’s no pressing strategic issue that absolutely has to be discussed by the leaders at this moment. The problem is that with Donald Trump, any gathering of NATO—an organization that he has an inherent hostility to—has the potential to spiral unexpectedly into a diplomatic crisis. With that in mind, it was a mistake to go ahead with the summit. After all, making them annual is only a recent phenomenon. That said, the fact that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is hosting it will help—Trump feels an affinity with him and may not want to disrupt the event. We know they’ll be focused on the implementation of spending commitments. It’s possible there will be some fireworks there, especially with the recent turmoil in the U.K. Other issues may come up, including Ukraine. But the best news would be no major news. No regression is progress of a kind.
This summit comes at a time of strained transatlantic relations in the wake of the Iran war and as the Trump administration withdraws U.S. key defense capabilities from Europe. Are European governments able to take on greater responsibility for their own security on a short timeline?
It depends a little on what one means by that. If the question is whether they could adequately replace American forces in a major crisis or conflict with Russia if one were to break out in the short term, the answer is no, definitely not, at least not adequately. They will try and do the best they can in such a crisis, which might be more than what the Russians anticipate even if it doesn’t fully compensate for the U.S. withdrawal. If the question is, will European governments say the right things about taking on responsibility and continue to spend more in the absence of a major crisis or conflict, the answer is mostly yes. That they will do. There will be some doubts and problems—we’ve seen the U.K. government fail to maintain its own commitments because of fiscal and political constraints—but they will try to muddle through and may get away with it, at least as far as they are not really tested by the Russians.
What would a successful outcome from this summit look like, and what risks or missed opportunities should we be watching for?
To me, a successful outcome is if the summit is a nothingburger and makes almost no news. Under Trump, summits are more of an opportunity for temper tantrums and diplomatic crises than a serious place to make real progress. With luck, Trump will feel heard, he’ll reaffirm that he succeeded in fixing NATO, and he won’t put any additional pressure on Ukraine to give up territory to appease Russia. That would be a win for this unnecessary summit.
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About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings
The Center on the United States and Europe(CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect transatlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.
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