Plus, a Q&A on British politics ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­    ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏  ͏ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­  
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Brookings Center on the United States and Europe

June 4, 2026

Dear readers and friends of U.S.-European relations,

 

I incautiously closed a review of underwhelming recent developments in the transatlantic arena in last month’s newsletter with “I can’t wait for June.” On reflection, I take that back. The Turkish capital Ankara will host a NATO summit on July 7–8, and let’s just say things are getting a little tense. In early May, the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany; mid-month, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth canceled the deployment of a brigade combat team and a deep precision strike (DPS) battalion to Germany. (President Trump has since ordered 5,000 troops to be sent to Poland. It’s confusing.) About a week later, a senior DoD adviser told European policymakers at NATO headquarters in Brussels that the United States will—as the Wall Street Journal reports—“reduce by one-third to one-half the pool of various military capabilities it would devote to NATO in a conflict, including U.S. commitments of strategic bombers and other long-range strike forces, some naval assets and air-to-air refueling tankers.”

 

The troop removals are less concerning to Europeans than the reversal of the Biden administration’s decision to send the DPS unit, which was intended to counter Russia’s stationing of mid-range Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. And that in turn is far less disturbing than the announcement that the current administration will withhold important conventional capabilities from Europe even in the case of war. Because—to quote a colleague of ours—“if you explicitly state that you won’t fight a conventional war in defense of Europe, why on earth should anyone believe that you would fight a nuclear one??? It makes no sense.”

 

These concerns are not mitigated by the secretary of state’s recent comment in a congressional hearing that Greenland belongs to Denmark “for now,” or reports that his department is planning to give grants to ideological allies in Europe. Then again… that worked well for Viktor Orbán.

 

Our June newsletter features the next installment of our Reimagining Europe’s security project with two pieces on U.S.-Europe-Middle East relations from Phil Gordon and Nathalie Tocci. Fiona Hill delivered the IWM Institute's annual lecture on resilience in wartime, and Michael Kimmage outlines how Vladimir Putin has painted himself into a corner on Ukraine. You’ll also find an informative (albeit disconcerting) Q&A on U.K. politics from Anand Menon.

 

Yours steadfastly,

 

Constanze Stelzenmüller

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

The Brookings Institution

 
France's President Emmanuel Macron (C) speaks next to France's Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu (4L) and France's Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin (3L) during a national defence council meeting on Middle East war at the Elysee Palace in Paris on March 17, 2026.

Can the United States and Europe still cooperate in the Middle East?

 

Philip H. Gordon argues that while transatlantic divisions over the Middle East are acute, Europe can still use its economic and humanitarian leverage to improve conditions while leaving the door open for greater U.S.-European cooperation.

 

Read Gordon’s analysis

 

In a companion piece for our Reimagining Europe’s security project, Nathalie Tocci highlights an opening for stronger European strategic engagement with regional partners.

Societal resilience and a world at war

 

Societal resilience has become a crucial aspect of national security in today’s unstable global landscape. Drawing on lessons from history, Fiona Hill argues that countries must adopt a whole-of-society approach to prepare for and withstand the threats of an international system at war.

 

Read more

 

In an essay adapted from a lecture at Brookings, German historian Karl Schlögel argues Russia’s war in Ukraine has reshaped European perception and geopolitical thinking.

Putin has no good way out of his war

 

Despite projecting resilience on the battlefield, Russia’s war in Ukraine has exposed significant structural weaknesses in the Russian system. Michael Kimmage argues that Vladimir Putin’s inability to achieve decisive victory threatens perceptions of Russian strength, putting his control at risk.

 

Read in the New York Times

 

Join us for an event!

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Russia and Ukraine: Societies transformed by war

 

On June 5, CUSE will host Anna Colin Lebedev for the 21st annual Raymond Aron Lecture. Colin Lebedev will examine how over a decade of war has changed both Russian and Ukrainian societies, followed by a panel with Ambassador John Tefft moderated by Fiona Hill.

 

Register to attend in person or online

     

    Q&A with Anand Menon

     

    June 23 marks the 10th anniversary of Brexit, the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union. Its effects continue to reverberate across British politics—not least in the fact that the U.K. has since cycled through six prime ministers. We spoke with CUSE nonresident fellow Anand Menon about where British politics stand now, the Labour Party’s waning popularity, and Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s future.

     

    After a poor performance in local elections last month, Keir Starmer and the Labour Party are facing an uphill battle to maintain control of the government. What explains the sharp decline in support for the Labour government less than two years after a landslide victory in 2024?

     

    Remember that the 2024 landslide flattered to deceive. Labour secured a massive majority in parliament. But it did so with a historically low share of the vote (less than 34%). The landslide was therefore less secure than it might have appeared—my colleague Rob Ford of the University of Manchester has spoken of Labour creating an electoral “Jenga tower.”

     

    That said, the decline in support that Labour has suffered has been unprecedented. That is partly down to the government’s own failings: its lack of a clear message, the numerous policy U-turns it has been forced into, the scandals (initially over things like Starmer having accepted free Taylor Swift tickets, more recently over the appointment of Peter Mandelson as ambassador to Washington despite his links to Jeffrey Epstein).

     

    Yet the troubles of Starmer’s government cannot be attributed solely to its record in office. The sheer level of its unpopularity speaks to a deeper and longer-term discontent. The country has experienced almost 20 years of weak economic growth and stagnating real wages. In this period, trust in politics has declined, as has support for the two traditional parties of government. In this sense, Starmer is being held responsible not only for his own failures but for two decades during which governments have failed to deliver.

     

    Reform UK and the Green Party both made notable gains in the recent local elections. How significant is their rise and what does it reveal about shifting voter priorities and dissatisfaction with the major parties? How seriously should we take the Restore Britain party, which is positioning itself to the right of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK?

     

    Reform can now credibly portray itself as the leading party of the right. Support for these parties is partly issue-based—Gaza has driven many Labour voters to the Greens, while Reform UK voters tend to think immigration is the most important issue facing the country. It also reflects a broader “anti-politics” sentiment stemming from the failure of mainstream parties to generate economic growth.

     

    But both the Greens and Reform UK will face significant challenges if they want to build on their success in recent local elections in a national election. They will need to professionalize, including in terms of candidate selection (a number of candidates have had to stand down, not least because of offensive social media posts). Success will bring challenges of its own, as they will have to maintain larger and more diverse voter coalitions and appeal to more moderate voters, which might cause some problems with more militant members.

     

    Reform UK will also have to cope with a challenge from its right in the form of the far-right party Restore Britain. While it is currently only polling between 7% and 9%, it could become a real thorn in Farage’s side, potentially preventing him from beating the Labour Party at the special election on June 18 in Makerfield, in which Mayor of Greater Manchester Andy Burnham—seen by many as Starmer’s presumptive heir—is standing for parliament.

     

    Starmer is facing criticism from within his own party, with figures such as Andy Burnham gaining attention as potential alternatives. What scenarios appear most plausible for Starmer’s leadership and for Labour’s durability in government?

     

    Starmer’s future will likely hinge on the outcome of this special election in Makerfield. No formal leadership challenge has been launched against him as yet, but senior colleagues—notably the former Health Secretary Wes Streeting—have been openly critical of his leadership. Should Burnham win the election, most people expect him to launch a challenge to the prime minister and win. He is the most popular Labour figure among both the public and party members, who will ultimately select the next prime minister.

     

    A more interesting question is what happens if Burnham loses. Starmer has said he has no intention of standing aside, and it then becomes a question of who has enough support among MPs to get the 81 signatures necessary to become a contender. It is conceivable that no one will stand, and that Starmer will cling on as a very weakened figure.

     

    The most likely scenario, however, is that either Burnham or another senior figure launches a challenge and Starmer is removed from office. But what happens then is far from clear. We know relatively little about the platforms of the other candidates. As mayor, Burnham has not had to spell out his foreign policy priorities, and while campaigning in Makerfield, he is being careful to stress local rather than national issues. There is thus likely to be a significant amount of uncertainty over the next few months, but with the expectation being that the U.K. will have a new prime minister, probably around the time of the Labour Party conference at the end of September.

       

      More research and commentary

       

      International Order. As President Trump pressures the multilateral system, Bruce Jones, Diana Paz García, and Jeffrey Feltman explore how middle and major powers are trying to preserve global governance and adapt it to a less U.S.-led world.

       

      Stalemate in Iran. As the closure of the Strait of Hormuz exposes the limits of U.S. power, Robert Kagan, Melanie W. Sisson, and Michael E. O’Hanlon discuss whether the United States has lost the Iran war and what options remain for reopening the strait.

       

      U.S. and Europe. Transatlantic tensions today are not a geographic split but an ideological divide between liberal and illiberal forces. Daniel S. Hamilton argues the future of U.S.-European relations hinges on how these challenges are addressed.

       

      💡 In case you missed it

      • Hormuz is a warning for the Indo-Pacific

        Lynn Kuok, Foreign Affairs

      • Are America’s allies finally learning to deal with Trump? A conversation with Philip H. Gordon and Mara Karlin

        Philip H. Gordon and Mara Karlin, Foreign Affairs

      • The Iran problem Trump can’t defer

        Thomas Wright, The Atlantic

       

      About the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings

       

      The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) offers independent research and recommendations for policymakers, fosters high-level dialogue on developments in Europe and global challenges that affect transatlantic relations, and convenes roundtables, workshops, and public forums on policy-relevant issues.

       
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